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SADDAM HUSSEIN AS HOSTES HUMANI GENERIS? 
SHOULD THE U.S. INTERVENE? 
By Professor Edieth Y. Wu, J.D., LL.M.* 
INTRODUCTION 
This article discusses several jurisdictional principles which may 
assist the United States in its efforts to acquire jurisdiction in certain 
situations that are declared, by the United States, egregious enough to 
warrant intervention. The United States has long used the "effects doc-
trine" 1 to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. This article concentrates on 
developing and employing the Hostes Humani Generis Theory, 2 and its 
past and possible future use. The central focus is to determine whether 
the possibility exists that the United States may use the theory in an 
effort to acquire physical jurisdiction over Saddam Hussein. 
A survey, though not comprehensive, of U.S. activity and approach 
to justice under the auspices of the Hostes Humani Generis Theory or 
parallel theories and the tools used to effect its edicts is also developed. 3 
The lack of proper fora to pursue international disputes, the need for and 
efforts to develop a supranational tribunal, 4 and international reaction, 
lack of support and defiance to this activity,5 are also critiqued. Finally, 
a conclusion is drawn that highlights U.S. aggressive use of the Hostes 
Humani Generis Theory in the extraterritorial context and the continued 
overt lack of support from the international community. Several sugges-
tions are detailed to curb continued use of the United States' extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction under the theory of Hostes Humani Generis or other 
parallel approaches6 
* Attorney Edieth Y. Wu is a member of the Texas Bar. Attorney Wu teaches at Thurgood 
Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University. The author wishes to thank God, her sisters, 
Suzanne Crockett and Mary Salazar, TMSL Librarians, Anga Spearman, her research assistant 
Jackie Fleming, and the TMSL faculty and staff. 
1. The "effects" doctrine allows the U.S. to assume extraterritorial jurisdiction to regulate 
U.S. commerce. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1909), 
explaining that the "intended effects test is a legitimate basis of jurisdiction when defendant's 
conduct abroad is intended to result in substantial, direct, and foreseeable effects on U.S. domestic 
or foreign commerce). See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 416 (2d 
Cir. 1945) (Alcoa) (explaining that the intended effects test is a legitimate basis of jurisdiction to 
regulate economic conduct abroad when the defendant intends market effects inside U.S.). 
2. See infra notes 7-39 and accompanying text, passim. 
3. See infra notes 30-148 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 149-202 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 203-263 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 263-276 and accompanying text. 
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THE HosTES HuMANI GENERIS THEORY 
Hastes Humani Generis7 ("HHG") is defined as an "enem[y] of the 
human race." The phrase Hastes Humani Generis refers to a theory 
prominent in the late 18th and early 19th century law of nations. Its es-
sence was that certain acts specified as universally reprehensible would 
make the perpetrator liable to capture and trial wherever he went. The 
principal, though by no means the only, application of Hastes Humani 
Generis was to pirates. 8 Piracy was included not simply because it usu-
ally occurred on the high seas, and outside the territorial jurisdiction of 
any sovereign, but because of its internationally recognized nature as a 
heinous threat to the common safety. The doctrine was not limited to 
pirates exclusively, however, because it applied also to land-based of-
fenders whose culpable acts earned them recognition as enemies of civi-
lization everywhere.9 "Pirates were merely a type, albeit a pervasive 
one, of universal offender."10 "Although the justice of each nation ought 
in general to be confined to the punishment of crimes committed in its 
own territories, we ought to except from this rule those villains, who, by 
the nature and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all public se-
curity, and declare themselves the enemies of the human race. 
Poisoners, assassins, and incendiaries by profession may be extermi-
nated wherever they are seized; for they attack and injure all nations, by 
trampling under foot the foundation of their common safety. Thus pi-
rates are sent to the gibbet by the first into whose hands they fall'' 11 The 
United States has long invoked the practice of assuming jurisdiction 
over piracy on the high seas, that is out of the jurisdiction of any particu-
lar state. The United States tried one such pirate for piratical acts upon 
the high seas against persons who were subjects of Spain. 12 The U.S. 
position was, and still is, not to allow such actors to evade justice. To-
day, this position extends far beyond piratical acts. 
Early in its history, the United States also tried to influence interna-
tional law - law of nations - when it attempted to abolish the slave trade 
and, thus, declared the act piracy. 13 A Spanish ship was seized by an 
American revenue cutter and coerced into an U.S. port and ultimately 
7. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 664 (5th ed. 1979). 
8. Jeffrey M. Blum and Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human 
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Ira/a 22 HARV. INT'L L. J. 53 
(1981) citing United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 144 (1820). 
9. Id., quoting E. DE VATIEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, 232-233 (5th ed. 1849). 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at fn. 36, quoting E. DE VATIEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 232-233 (5th ed. 1849). 
12. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 611 (1818) (Established that the U.S. has jurisdic-
tion when the act, murder or robbery, would be punishable in the U.S.). 
13. Slave Trade Act, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 § 7 (1807). 
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into a U.S. court. 14 Although the United States was also engaged in 
slavery at this time, 15 it nevertheless resisted claims for restitution upon 
the ground that the persons in question were not by law (U.S. law) to be 
considered slaves, but free. The United States asserted that U.S. laws 
were proper and not the laws of Spain. The United States argued that its 
national policy dictated this result. 16 "The acts of Congress provide that, 
however brought here [slaves to America], they shall be set free, and 
sent back to their native land." 17 The United States also asserted that it 
would assume jurisdiction over such instances where pirates were 
brought before its courts regardless of how the pirates were brought to 
U.S. shores, and further that the action constituted a pledge to all nations 
engaged in the slave trade activity that the United States was committed, 
even if jurisdiction was not clear, to asserting its long arm jurisdiction. 18 
This pledge continues because the United States extends jurisdiction ex-
traterritorially by using its articulation of what actions "effect" the 
United States. 19 
The United States went as far as it could, nationally, to abolish the 
slave trade. Articulations of what the law should be and U.S. vigor in 
this area was highly criticized,20 and some of the sentiments about 
double standards still ring true today, a fa~ade of "false legalism."21 
"The common denominator of Hostes Humani Generis seems to 
have been the magnitude of the threat posed by the acts, coupled with 
the universality of condemnation of the acts. The effect of the doctrine 
was to hold individuals liable, both civilly and criminally, for violations. 
When wrongdoers violated the law of nations their liability followed 
them everywhere. It was unimportant whether their acts had any con-
nection with the forum state, as all nations had a duty to enforce interna-
tional law. There was no doubt that United States courts, for example, 
were competent to try foreign nationals who committed acts of universal 
14. The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 106 (1825). 
15. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII (The U.S. did not emancipate the slaves until 1865). 
16. The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 71. 
17. Id at 71. 
18. Id. at 72. See Slave Trade Act, supra note 13, at § 7 (made no distinction as to the 
national character of ships even if found outside U.S. waters the ship was automatically forfeited). 
19. See supra note 1. 
20. Id. at 86. ("For more than twenty years this traffic was protected by your constitution, 
exempted from the whole force of your legislative power, its fruits yet lay at the foundation of that 
compact. The principle, by which you continue to enjoy them, is protected by that constitution, 
forms a basis of your representatives, is infused into your laws, and mingles itself with all the 
sources of authority. Relieve yourself of these absurdities, before you assume the right of sitting 
in judgment on the morality of other nations. But this you can not do"). 
21. Yamashita v. Styler, 327 U.S. 1, 30 (1946). 
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culpability outside the United States."22 Even though the doctrine de-
clined in use when nations adopted the notion that international law only 
applied to nations' conduct,23 the United States has maintained and pur-
sued the notion that U.S. courts not only have the power to, ordinarily, 
but also the obligation to decide "cases and controversies."24 Addition-
ally, the U.S. Congress has the power to define and punish ... offenses 
against the Laws of Nations.25 Therefore, the U.S. continues to extend 
jurisdiction, in a myriad of circumstances, when it determines that an act 
poses threats, which should be construed as "universally culpable"; thus, 
U.S. courts have the obligation to decide the issue even if the acts oc-
curred outside the United States. 
The universality principle26 is very similar to the Hostes Humani 
Generis Theory. According to the universality principle, "a state may 
exercise jurisdiction with respect to certain specific universally con-
demned crimes, principally piracy, wherever and by whomever commit-
ted, without regard to the connection of the conduct with that state."27 
In some instances the crime is so universally condemned that the perpe-
trator is an enemy of all people; therefore, the nation with custody can 
try and punish him.28 The problems with classifying an individual or 
administration as "HHG" are the lack of an adequate definition and in-
ternational acceptance of what constitutes an "enemy" and ambiguity as 
to when the behavior warrants applying the label or, ultimately, pursuing 
jurisdiction. 
Acts of aggression are rapidly coming into focus in the interna-
tional area. By the standard of contemporary international law, terrorists 
are [also] known as Hostes Humani Generis, common enemies of hu-
mankind.29 The United States has included torture30 as an activity that 
violates universally accepted norms of international law of human rights, 
regardless of the nationality of the torturer, and, thus whenever an al-
22. Supra note 8, at 61. 
23. Id. 
24. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
25. Id. at. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
26. s. HOUSTON LAY AND HOWARD J. TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING TO THE ACTIVITIES 
OF MAN IN SPACE (1970) (Discussing traditionally accepted forms of jurisdiction, universality, 
territoriality, protective, etc.). 
27. Id. 
28. Matter of Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1985). 
29. Louis Rene Beres, Assassination of Terrorists May Be Law-Enforcing -A Brief Accord-
ing to International Law (visited June 29, 1998) <http://www.freeman.io.com/m_online/nov97/ 
beres2.htm>. 
30. United Nations Declaration on The Protection of All Persons From Being Subjected to 
Torture, General Assembly Resolution 3452, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 34, 91 U.N. Doc. N1034 
(1975). 
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leged torturer is found and served with process by an alien who is in the 
United States, U.S. federal courts have jurisdiction.31 
Accordingly, citizens of Paraguay were allowed to sue a 
Paraguayan citizen in U.S. courts for wrongfully causing the death of 
their son, allegedly by the use of torture. The plaintiffs claimed that this 
act was done in retaliation for the father's political views.32 The U.S. 
court assumed jurisdiction even after the defendant's Paraguayan coun-
sel vehemently averred that Paraguayan law provided a full and ade-
quate civil remedy for the alleged wrong.33 
U.S. courts also have jurisdiction to try aliens for conspiracy to 
smuggle drugs into the United States.34 The Courts have interpreted this 
to mean that the defendant does not have to ever have been in the United 
States For example, an alien was charged with conspiracy to import 
drugs into the United States and the Court assumed jurisdiction over the 
matter.35 
Terrorism has been defined as the substitute application of violence 
or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society to weaken or 
even overthrow the incumbents and to bring about political change. 36 It 
shades into 'guerrilla warfare.' 37 "In its long history terrorism has ap-
peared in many guises; today society faces not one terrorism but many 
terrorisms."38 These types of activities are recognized as crimes against 
humanity: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or dur-
ing the war; or persecutions of political, racial or religious grounds in 
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the coun-
31. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (1948) (The statute allows aliens to sue in U.S. 
courts for torts, including torture, committed in other sovereigns' territories). 
32. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1980). 
33. Id. at 877. 
34. 21 u.s.c. § 960 (1981). 
35. Marin v United States, 352 F.2d 174 (51h Cir. 1965). See Rocha v. United States, 288 
F.2d 545, cert. den. 366 U.S. 948 (U.S. court used the protection principle to assert jurisdiction 
over a crime committed by an alien while abroad a ship. Highlighted extraterritorial effects of 
U.S. law). 
36. Walter Laquer, Postmodern Terrorism, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 25 (Discussing 
modem examples of terrorist activity). 
37. Tom Wells, Why We Would Do Well to Ape Mao's Guerrilla Tactics, MARKETING, April 
17, 1997, at 18 (The word 'guerrilla' derives from the Spanish term for 'little soldier' - usually 
uses fire and maneuver tactics to harry the enemy. According to Mao Zedong, among other 
things, it "oppose[s] fixed battle lines and positional warfare and favour[s] fluid battle lines and 
mobile warfare."). 
38. See supra note 36 at 25. 
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try where perpetrated.39 The United States defines what types of behav-
ior must be prosecuted and proceeds accordingly; these definitions are 
analogous to "HHG." 
A great deal of controversy regarding the long arm of U.S. jurisdic-
tion arose as a result of the court martial, by U.S. military court, of 
General Yamashita,40 after the cessation of the war. Here the United 
States construed an ambiguity-whether the charge against the peti-
tioner stated a recognized violation of the law of war and whether the 
U.S. court was the proper forum-in the light most favorable to the 
United States. Therefore, after concluding in the affirmative, the United 
States used this construction, and rushed to prosecute Yamashita after 
his writ of habeas corpus was denied.41 The court was not only criti-
cized for denying Yamashita his due process rights but was also criti-
cized that popular passion or frenzy of the moment influenced its 
decision. Yamashita was the leader of an army that had been totally 
destroyed by the United States. Many casualties and violent acts of war 
took place. He voluntarily surrendered. At that point he was entitled to 
all the proper procedures of a fair trial and to be free from charges of 
legally unrecognized crimes that would serve only to permit his accusers 
to satisfy their desires of revenge. The trial was also held in an area 
where the United States had complete control; he was rushed to trial 
under an improper charge, given insufficient time to prepare an adequate 
defense, deprived of the benefits of some of the most elementary rules of 
evidence, and summarily sentenced to be hanged.42 
In Yamashita' s situation, the United States seemingly viewed the 
alleged atrocities as acts against humanity; therefore, Yamashita was an 
"enemy to mankind." Justice Murphy warned the Court that "the high 
feelings of the moment doubtless will be satisfied. But in the sober af-
terglow will come the realization of the boundless and dangerous impli-
cation of the procedure sanctioned [by the Court] today. But even more 
significant will be the hatred and ill-will growing out of ... this unprece-
dented procedure."43 That warning continues to have merit today. 
39. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 at. 1546, 1547, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279. The United Nations General Assembly in a resolution proposed by the U.S. unani-
mously affirmed the principles of international law recognized in the Nuremberg Charter and 
Judgment. U.N GAOR, 95 at 188, UN Doc. N64/Add.l (1946). 
40. Yamashita v. Styler, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (Commanding General of the Imperial Japanese 
Army and Military Governor of the Philippines was tried and convicted for a violation of the law 
of war; he was classified as an enemy belligerent for failing to prevent certain acts; he was not 
charged with any acts). 
41. Id. at 26, 30-31. 
42. Id. at 27-28. 
43. Id. at 28 (Justice Murphy dissenting). 
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Further, in an effort to bolster and justify its case for extraterritori-
ally expanding its reach, the U.S. Government and the media often use 
terms to vilify the offender.44 For example, President Bush referred to 
Noriega, Panama's head of state, as a "drug trafficker" who should get a 
fair trial. Dan Rather, on the CBS Evening News, called the General 
"scum" and "a thug." Peter Jennings on ABC's World News Tonight 
called Noriega an "odious creature."45 Noriega was later prosecuted in 
U.S. court for his activities.46 Saddam is perhaps the closest analogy to 
Noriega. For example, Saddam, the central focus of this article, has 
been called a menace, among other things.47 Saddam has been com-
pared to Hitler and also called a war lover.48 "Like a vampire, the war 
lover feeds on the blood of the living.49 President Bush even said that 
Saddam was "worse than Hitler."50 
Yugoslavia's President Slobadan Milosevic was referred to as "an 
international pariah."51 The classifying continues: Iran, Libya, North 
Korea, Cuba, and especially Iraq are often referred to as "The World's 
Six Rogue States."52 Iran and Iraq are not only considered rogues but 
also "Pariah States. "53 Washington has also classified Iran "as one of the 
chief threats to global security."54 
When Saddam threatened to bum Israel, the U.S. publicly called 
Iraq's human rights practices "abysmal."55 As a result of this aggres-
sion, "some [U.S.] officials wanted to do more [than threaten] and pro-
posed putting Iraq back on the terrorist list."56 Americans are openly 
44. PAT M. HOLT, SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND PuBLIC POLICY -A DILEMMA OF DEMOCRACY 
172 (The media is important because, "In simplest terms the government wants the news 
presented in a way that reflects credit on the government. To this end the government tries might-
ily to influence, if it cannot control, what flows through the channel that the media provide be-
tween the government and the public, because this is what shapes public attitude toward 
government. In the fashionable phrase of the 1990s, the government seeks to put a spin on the 
news. The media view these efforts as directed toward distortion and concealment, they conse-
quently believe it is their job, even their responsibility, to disclose these efforts.). 
45. Richard Fricker, Dealing With The Maximum Leader, J.A.B.A. Apr. 1990, at 54, 56 . 
46. Noriega v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1389, 140 L.Ed.2d 648 (1998). 
47. Steven J. Thomma, U.S. Finding Its Roar Lack Bite in Recent Foreign Upheavals, Hous-
TON CHRON., May 22, 1998, at 36 A. 
48. JoHN E. STOESSINGER, WHY NATIONS Go To WAR 182 (6th ed. 1993). 
49. Id. at 182. 
50. J.F.O. McAllister, The Lessons of Iraq, TIME, Nov. 1992, at 57. 
51. Kosovo 's Cauldron Bubbles On, THE EcoNOMIST, June 20-26, 1998, at 57. 
52. Lawrence F. Korb, Our Overstuffed Armed Forces, FoREI.GN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 
22, 25 .. 
53. Jeffrey E. Garten, Business and Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFF., MAY-JuNE 1997, at 67 . 
54. Graham E. Fuller and Ian 0. Lesser, Persian Gulf Myths, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-June 1997, 
at 47. 
55. See McAllister, supra note 50, at 57. 
56. See McAllister supra note 50, at 58 
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discussing the possibility of not only threatening to treat Saddam as "an 
enemy to mankind" (Hostes Humani Generis) and in the traditional 
sense bring him to justice but are also discussing assassination. In cer-
tain circumstances political assassination is a moral act. If the attempt 
on Hitler's life in July 1944 had succeeded, the world would have been 
spared oceans of blood and tears. And if Saddam Hussein had been 
removed before 1990, two wars might have been averted. Hitler was 
Nazi Germany, and Saddam still is Iraq today. As long as he survives in 
power, civilization is in danger.57 "The Iraqi leader isn't going away. 
That means assassination may be Clinton's best option."58 "Relaxing 
the moral norm against it [assassination] is a regrettable but justifiable 
price to pay when confronted with someone like Saddam who is unique 
in his capacity to inflict evil on his own people and the rest of the world. 
It's one of the extremely rare circumstances where killing can be a hu-
manitarian act that saves far more lives than it risks."59 Former CIA 
director, Robert Gates, said that assassination is a "non-option [only] 
because Saddam is so elusive and well protected."60 A targeted air 
strike against the homes or bunkers where Saddam is most likely to be 
found has also been strongly suggested.61 "If we can kill Saddam we 
should."62 The United States is also concerned about other activities 
that are against "humanity," and often takes measures to suppress them. 
Terrorism and tyranny are often grouped together. Terrorist acts 
around the world are of great interest and concern to the United States. 
This is not only because the U.S. economic, ideological, military, tech-
nological, and cultural primacy are overwhelming, 63 but also because the 
United States often intervenes with threats and other methods to effectu-
ate compliance to combat many international problems that are actually 
crimes against humanity: terrorism, tyrants, human rights violations, and 
its general concern about deterring aggression, especially in the area of 
controlling weapons of mass destruction. The United States, therefore, 
"need[s] to check the capabilities of terrorist groups and states that sup-
port terrorism."64 The United States must pre-empt this activity by de-
nying them funds, arms or safe havens and deal with it forcefully to 
57. JoHN G. STOESSINGER, WHY NATIONS Go TO WAR 205 (6th ed. 1993). 
58. George Stephanopoulos, We Should Kill Saddam, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 1997, at 34. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Samuel Huntington, The Erosion of American National Interest, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-
Oct. 1997, at 42. 
64. R. JAMES WOOLSEY, THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE ON THE GLOBAL FRONTIER 3 
(1993). 
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protect itself, its allies, and friends. 65 "Terrorism can be permitted to 
have no role to play whatever on our new global frontier. None."66 
Tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, nobody can have a 
right to: and this is making use of the power any one has in his hands, 
not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private, 
separate advantage.67 
Wherever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to 
another's harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given 
him by the law, and makes use of the force he had under his command to 
compass that upon the subject which the law allows not, ceases in that to 
be a Magistrate, and acting without authority may be opposed, as any 
other man who by force invades the right of another.68 
Some of Saddam's conduct may border on tyranny - by jeopardiz-
ing the international community, he has transgressed many. 
The U.S. zeal to influence democracy, suppress tyrants, and create 
open markets is evinced by its assistance to ease Ferdinand Marcos of 
the Philippines into exile69; the backing of the contra guerrillas in Nica-
ragua,70and the assistance to Cambodia in 1993 with its first free, fair, 
and comprehensive elections.71 Also, "in July 1994 the United States 
successfully persuaded the UN Security Council to authorize all neces-
sary means" to remove the coup leaders [from Haiti] and restore Aristide 
to the Presidency. This was a landmark: for the first time the United 
Nations had called for international action to restore a democratically 
elected leader.72 Of course, this was due to U.S. influence and persua-
sion, but most of all it was due to the United States' dogged commit-
ment to implement its version of democracy, the rule of law, and to 
continue its efforts to secure harmony and world peace by aggressively 
pursuing terrorists and tyrants wherever they are found The use of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 73 (WMD) is also an area of grave concern 
for the United States. Sovereigns as well as fringe groups are potential 
dangers. The United States is committed to disarming any group or na-
tion possessing weapons of mass destruction - as the threat to use weap-
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. JoHN LOCKE, TREATISE CONCERNING CIVIL GOVERNMENT 71 (Josian Tucker ed., 1967). 
68. Id .. 
69. Strobe Talbott, Democracy And The National Interest, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 
53. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) include but are not limited to nuclear, biological, 
and chemical. See Betts infra note 74. 
9
Wu: Saddam Hussein as Hostes Humani Generis? Should the U.S. Interven
Published by SURFACE, 1998
64 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 26:55 
ons of mass destruction heightens, the U.S. will doubtless take more 
preemptive defense measures that will target potential groups and bread-
ing grounds, whether inside the United States or in Iran or Iraq.74 When 
conflicts threaten U.S. interest, or when they are fueled by nations or 
factions that seek to obtain weapons of mass destruction, or that employ 
terrorist tactics, then we must understand and be prepared to deal with 
them.75 "Today there are twenty-five countries - many hostile to our 
interests - that are developing nuclear, biological, and chemical weap-
ons. More than two-dozen countries alone have research programs un-
derway on chemical weapons, and Libya, Iran, and Iraq have stockpiled 
them."76 
Many sources of contention exist not only with WMD but other 
aggressive acts. This activity may lead the United States to aggressively 
pursue Saddam under the Hostes Humani Generis Theory. Based on his 
wide range of activities, Saddam may become the example to the world 
if the U.S. decides to classify him and ultimately pursue him under the 
auspices of the "HHG" theory. Ultimately, this decision may be expe-
dited if acts of aggression and terrorism are traced to sources that are 
aligned with Saddam.77 For example, the U.S. adopted the Antiterror-
ism Act78 to deter terrorism both nationally and intemationally.79 
A. United States' Approach to Justice 
The U.S. has acted [often] as if the emergence anywhere in the 
hemisphere of a government it deems Marxist so threatens the sover-
eignty of this nation or its allies [or smaller more vulnerable nations] as 
74. Richard K. Betts, The New Threat of Mass Destruction, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 
26, 38. 
75. See WooLSEY, supra note 64, at 1-3. 
76. Id. 
77. See also Alan Cooperman, Terror Strikes Again, U.S. NEws AND WoRLD REPORT, Aug. 
17-24, 1998, at 10 (Recent terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies prompt new fears and a vow, by the 
U.S., of retribution. Terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania are suspected as 
having Arab connections. Today, a Saudi millionaire Osama Bin Ladin, is suspected of financing 
terror around the world. Brian Jenkins, a terrorism expert said "we deal with universes of like-
minded fanatics from which emerge ad hoc conspiracies, or whose members provide the soldiers 
for a terrorist leader." The U.S. has attempted to apprehend Bin Laden but requesting help assist-
ance from the Afghanistan people, but to no avail. Bin Laden issued a fatwa, religious ruling, "to 
kill the Americans and their allies."). 
78. Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act, 104 Pub. No. 132, 10 Stat. 1214 (1996) 
79. Id at § 702 (Acts of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries - whoever, involving 
conduct transcending national boundaries ... a) kills, kidnaps, maims, commits and assault result-
ing in serious bodily injury, or assaults with a dangerous weapon any person within the U.S. orb) 
creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to any other person by destroying within the U.S. 
or by attempting or conspiring to destroy or damage any structure, conveyance, or real or personal 
property .... Further, there is Extraterritorial Federal Jurisdiction). 
10
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 26, No. 1 [1998], Art. 5
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol26/iss1/5
1998] Saddam Hussein as Hostes Humani Generis? 65 
to justify measures to abort or overthrow the offending regime. 80 Much 
of the time, this decision is a unilateral one.81 
U.S. law has an aggressive extraterritorial reach in the area of trade, 
"as in attempts to penalize foreign companies for violating U.S. trade 
sanctions."82 If a foreign suspect need to be brought to justice the 
United States has, at times, resorted to force. Using forcible means to 
bring international criminals to justice is not a novel one in international 
law, especially when dealing with situations where the offender is per-
ceived as a threat to humankind ( Hostes Humani Generis ). Terrorists 
"are Hostes Humani Generis, common enemies to mankind"83 "Men 
who are by profession poisons or incendiaries may be exterminated 
wherever they are caught, for they direct their disastrous attacks against 
all nations by destroying the foundation of common safety ."84 
For many years, the United States has routinely used speculative 
means, kidnapping or forcibly abducting, to bring defendants to justice. 
For example, Drug Enforcement Agents kidnapped a Mexican citizen 
who was suspected of killing an American special agent. 85 This act was 
committed even though the United States has an extradition treaty with 
Mexico. 86 These practices continue even after earlier warning "that ille-
gal restraints are unauthorized and unjustified and unjustified by any 
foreign policy ... and that commonly accepted judicial standards are to 
be recognized and enforced. 87 
Perhaps more vivid, the situation with former Panamanian leader 
Manuel Noriega epitomizes the United States' aggressive approach 
when it perceives that a nation or person is somehow threatening the 
United States' interpretation of how certain events should develop and 
the desired outcome. In December 1989, President Bush deployed mili-
tary troops to Panama and proclaimed that "General Manuel Noriega 
had declared a state of war with the United States and publicly 
threatened the lives of Americans in Panama."88 Even those who advo-
80. Tom. J. Farer, U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights Activist: 
Panama: Beyond The Charter Paradigm, 84 AM. J. l.NT'L L. 503 (1990). 
81. Id. at 508. 
82. Charles Lane, Changing Iran-Germany's New Ostpolitik, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 
1995, at 77. 
83. See Beres supra note 29, at 2. 
84. Id., quoting Nuremberg Tribunal 1945 (discussing the limited right to assassination). 
85. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992) (U.S. agents, with the help of 
Mexican nationals, forcibly abducted the doctor, and he was tried in U.S. court). 
86. Treaty of Extradition, May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059. 
87. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 30 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
88. Ved P. Nanda, U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights Activ-
ists?: The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama Under International ww, 84 AM. J. 
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cate the validity and viability [of humanitarian] intervention can justify 
only a limited and temporary unilateral necessity and proportionality in 
the use of force as required under customary international law. Addi-
tionally, such unilateral action is ultimately subject to community re-
view. Thus, notwithstanding the lack of agreement on the proper 
interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter, while rescue operations 
of one's nationals might be considered permissible, the United States' 
invasion of Panama does not satisfy the minimum required standards. 89 
Even though the incidents are serious, the question remains -
whether they warrant the launching of a full-scale invasion, of a size not 
seen since the Vietnam War? The conclusion is inescapable [to U.S. 
critics] that the Untied States has failed to provide sufficient evidence to 
prove that the "necessity prerequisite" was met.90 Restoration of democ-
racy, supposedly, was another reason the United States intervened in 
Panama. Noriega's strong-arm tactic to gain power, the roar of opposi-
tion by the Panamanian people, and ultimately Noriega' s nullification of 
the U.S. supported election of an opposition party as Panama's Presi-
dent91 were all critical cogs in the U.S. decision to use force. The 
United States interpreted Noriega' s behavior as quite egregious; never-
theless, "no international legal instrument permits intervention to main-
tain or impose a democratic form of government in another state. "92 
President Bush further justified intervention because the invasion was 
delayed until after Endara, the new President, was sworn in. Therefore, 
he believed that the invasion was legitimate because Endara, the puppet, 
immediately asked the United States for aid in restoring democracy to 
Panama.93 And the United States acquiesced. 
The use of force as . a deterrent to certain behavior is not wise. "If 
democratic forces are well developed in the target state, they will likely 
prevail without foreign assistance; if they are underdeveloped or nonex-
istent, a period of foreign-dominated "tutelage" is likely to follow, 
which is contrary to the concept of self-determination."94 Even though 
there was no direct threat that the Panama Canal was in jeopardy, 95 the 
United States proceeded to invade Panama. Although Noriega was 
INr'L L. 494 (1990) quoting Statement by The President (Dec 20, 1989) (Office of the Press 
Secretary, the White House). 
89. See Nanda, supra note 88, at 495. 
90. See Nanda, supra note 88, at 496. 
91. See Nanda, supra note 88, at 498. 
92. See Nanda, supra note 88, at 498. 
93. See Fricker, supra note 45, at 54. 
94. Id., citing Berry, The Conflict Between United States Intervention And Promoting De-
mocracy in the Third World, 60 TEMPLE L.Q. 1015 (1987). 
95. Id. at 501. 
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never, officially, declared as an Hostes Humani Generis, the evidenced 
established that he was treated as such. This action may open the door 
to pursue Saddam. Additionally, Noriega's indictment and subsequent 
arrest "reflects the long-standing U.S. practice of asserting extraterrito-
rial legislative jurisdiction under the "effects" doctrine, or arguably 
under the "protective principle,"96 or even more so the Hostes Humani 
Generis theory. 
No State ... has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. 
The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any 
other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of 
the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.97 
The United States often ignores this directive and also the interna-
tional preference for multilateral intervention. This international prefer-
ence stems from several factors: "multilateral efforts may provide a 
check on interventions by a single state to pursue its own ends (political, 
military, economic, etc.) rather than merely correcting the international 
outrage that may have justified the intervention ... [and] to assure that 
the incident that justifies the intervention is indeed viewed by the inter-
national community as of sufficient magnitude to warrant interven-
tion. "98 Multilateral support does not automatically mean that the 
desired results are met. But, the results are often counterproductive 
when a state acts unilaterally. 
For example, after the United States intervened in Panama, its de-
sired results were not realized.Supporters of Guillermo Endara, Pan-
ama's President, "are turning against him. Labor unrest is on the rise, 
and a feeling exist that the United States is replacing Noriega as the real 
power."99 Nevertheless, the Noriega approach may also be used to pur-
sue Saddam. The United States has pursued prosecution in situations 
that were not distinctly demarcated as falling within U.S. jurisdiction. 
Perhaps the most notable commander detained by U.S. forces was 
Yamashita, 100who was actually executed for war crimes committed dur-
ing the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Yamashita' s case was 
heard before the United States Supreme Court on a writ of habeas 
corpus. The Court upheld the verdict and sentence, but not unani-
96. Id. 
97. Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.l.A.S. 
No. 2361. 
98. See Nanda, supra note 88, at 502. 
99. Alima Guerrero, Year-Old Democracy in Panama Insecure Despite U.S. Backing, The 
Commercial Appeal, MEMPHIS Assoc. PREss, Dec. 20, 1990, at A4. 
100. Yamashita v. Styler, 327 U.S. 1 (1947). See supra notes 40-43. 
13
Wu: Saddam Hussein as Hostes Humani Generis? Should the U.S. Interven
Published by SURFACE, 1998
68 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 26:55 
mously. 101 More recently, but in the same long-arm style, the United 
States government captured Fawaz Yunis, 102a citizen of Lebanon, after 
he and several of his comrades hijacked a Royal Jordanian Airlines Air-
craft in Beirut and attempted to have the plane flown to Tunis. This 
action further illustrates how the United States intervenes based oncer-
tain types of activity that it determines too egregious to escape adjudica-
tion. At the time he was apprehended, "Yunis was not, of course, the 
most important terrorist on the United States' wanted list"103 ; his acts 
were interpreted by the United States, not only as a threat to the United 
States but also as a threat to humanity (Hostes Humani Generis). U.S. 
interest in the flight was perhaps minimal because, of fifty-sixty passen-
gers, only three were Americans, all of whom survived. 104 Here again, 
U.S. agents working in Cyprus obtained local help to lure Yunis from 
Lebanon to Cyprus where, in route in international waters, DEA and FBI 
agents arrested him. 105 Considering the extremely low number of Amer-
icans on the flight, was the United States, out of its obligation to "try 
cases and controversies,"106 left with no alternative but to pursue Yunis? 
An increase in these types of incidents, leads one to ask "whether or not 
it is correct that some of the constraints of the U.S. Constitution can 
shed like an overcoat when officers of the United States pass the fron-
tiers of the Republic ... [and] whether the Constitution prohibits action 
abroad by U.S. officers to seize suspects and bring them by force to the 
United States for prosecution"?107 
Right or wrong, these questions, doubtless, have an affirmative an-
swer. To illustrate, in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 108 the Supreme 
Court exercised its traditional power of treaty interpretation to adjudi-
cate the abduction of a Mexican national by executive authority for the 
purpose of criminal prosecution in the United States. 109 Parties enlisted 
by the DEA, forcibly abducted Alvarez-Machain from his medical of-
101. See Fricker, supra note 45, at 56. 
102. United States v. Yunis, 681 F.Supp. 909 (D.D.C. 1988). 
103. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution And Interna-
tional Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, (1990) (discussing U.S. tactics and other instances 
of capturing terrorist and other perceived criminals). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. See supra note 24. 
107. See Lowenfeld, supra note 103, at 460 (explaining developments in Ker v. Illinois, 119 
U.S. 436 (1886), where defendant was forcibly arrested in Peru, prior to demands on that govern-
ment to surrender the suspect). 
108. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992). 
109. David Ring, Notes and Comments, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Literalism, Expe-
diency And The "New World Order," 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 495 (1994) (discussing the Court's 
decision and whether its integrity was compromised and the Court's lawless exercise of power). 
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fice in Guadalajara and transported him by private plane to El Paso, 
where DEA officials were waiting to take him into custody. uo The cir-
cumstances surrounding the abduction are very similar to the U.S. activ-
ity in Yunis, clandestine and extremely contrary to the norms of 
international law. To some Americans, Saddam's activities are more 
egregious than than the acts of Alvarez-Machain or Yunis. Therefore, 
the United States may argue that his activities are imminent threats to 
the American people and their allies. 
The Second and Ninth Circuits have recognized such an exception 
to the Ker-Frisbie Rule that a defendant himself is not suppressible as a 
fruit of an unlawful arrest. 111 These courts reasoned that if the govern-
mental conduct is so beyond the scope of the law as to shock the con-
science, then the court would lack jurisdiction over these defendants. 112 
Alvarez-Machain was neither an isolated occurrence nor is the evolving 
United States policy regarding extradition treaties directed exclusively to 
Mexico. The United States has clearly departed from the common un-
derstanding of civilized nations as to the function and scope of extradi-
tion treaties. In effect, the Executive Branch seeks the right to disavow 
treaty obligations on an ad hoc basis - the Government has tired of the 
niceties of extradition. This position does not derive from any rule of 
law, but from the vagaries of assumed exigency .113 This same type of 
exception based on exigency may also soon be applied to Saddam in 
order to assume jurisdiction over him. 
This same approach is also becoming more apparent in all aspects 
of acquiring jurisdiction over international suspects. If certain exigent 
circumstances exist, in a Hostes Humani Generis situation, for instance, 
then the United States may also forgo the niceties of multilateral cooper-
ation and unilaterally pursue that particular defendant. "By kidnapping 
Alvarez-Machain, the United States Government provided Mexico with 
a small reminder of the arrogant and unbridled exercise of American 
power."u4 This show of strength was not only a reminder to Mexico but 
also a reminder to the entire world, and perhaps ominously to Saddam, 
that the United States is a major power. And more importantly, that it 
110. See Ring, supra note 109, at 497. 
111. See Nanda, supra note 88. 
112. See Ring, supra note 109, at 497 citing United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 
62, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 
1270, 1271 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975), United States v. Tos-
canino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). 
113. See Ring, supra note 109, at 416. 
114. See Ring, supra note 109, at 530. 
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has the power to carry out its edicts because ultimately "the foundation 
of jurisdiction is physical power,"115 and that it always will be. 
Without a doubt, "[i]t should not be mistaken that the use of abduc-
tions as a means of attaining jurisdiction over a criminal defendant is a 
dangerous dance that should be conducted only in light of the most care-
ful reflection and planning. Abducting an unsuspecting criminal to 
stand trial in the United States violates all notions of decency and fair 
play inherent in the American judicial process."116 Such abductions 
usually will violate some inner sense of justice and many people may 
automatically assume that principles of comity suggest that the United 
States will condone the abduction of Americans to stand trial in foreign 
courts. 117 This cannot be acceptable to the United States because of its 
long history of protecting its nationals, and its general suspicion about 
justice abroad118 
Until a global peace can somehow be worked out among all the 
nations of the world, we will constantly have a world divided. 119 This 
division, apparently, does not bother the United States because it finds 
justification in its activities, and the United States doubtless would never 
actually acquiesce to the abduction of Americans. Thus, "kidnapping by 
authority of the United States of America ... [should] shock the con-
science of the nation ... the distinctions between kidnapping with or 
without torture are understood to be unconvincing, in fact and in law; 
and that the United States would look at the uneven practice of other 
states not as a justification for indecent action, but as a challenge to 
develop - by example and by treaty - a rule worthy to be called interna-
tional law."120 
The United States has often resorted to covert activity to apprehend 
U.S. declared "wanted defendants." Unilateral activity to apprehend 
persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWC) 121 has also been added to the 
list of recent U.S. activity. For example, "a U.S. special operations task 
force has been conducting one of the broadest covert operations since 
115. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (J. Holmes). 
116. Arthur Shin, Note And Comment, On The Borders of Law Enforcement-The Use of 
Extraterritorial Abductions As A Means of Attaining Jurisdiction Over The International Crimi-
nal, 17 WHIITIER L. REv. 327, 397 (1995) citing ETHAN A. NADELMAN, Cops AcRoss BORDERS, 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAw ENFORCEMENT 426-36 (PA State Univ. Press 
1993). 
117. See Shin, supra note 116, at 392. 
118. See infra note 234. 
119. Id. 
120. See Lowenfeld, supra note 103, at 493 
121. Richard J. Newman, Hunting War Criminals, U.S. NEws AND WoRLD REP., July 6, 
1998 at 45. 
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the Vietnam War, gathering intelligence on PIFWCs and helping to 
seize them in a series of raids."122 The US-dominated task force con-
tinue to track PIFWCs and gather information on other wanted individu-
als, such as Radovan Karadjic, the former Bosnian Serb President, was 
charged with the responsibility for the murder of thousands, was re-
cently tracked. 123 
The United States probably has the ability, militarily, to carry out 
its threats against offending nations or, as defined by the United States, 
"liberty opponents."124 This is true because the United States spends at 
least three times what others spend on national defense. 125 "America's 
global ability to offer threats or protection will [probably] remain unique 
for years." 126 If not through military might then through economic 
might, sanctions. The United States has engaged in kidnapping, abduc-
tion, prosecuting criminals, and threats of military force. Saddam Hus-
sein has had a number of sanctions as well as military force aimed in his 
direction. 
On January 12, 1991, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution to al-
low war, if necessary, between the U.S. against Saddam. In Operation 
Desert Storm, 250,000 troops were sent to Kuwait in an attempt to actu-
ally curb Saddam's aggression against Kuwait. 127 Even though this war 
was not quite a unilateral engagement but more of a coalition of UN 
forces, 128 the United States took a very active role in the strategic plan-
ning and also implored the Israelis and committed thousands of Ameri-
can troops to the cause. 129 In the United States, the war was seen as an 
American war. After the cease-fire, President Bush exclaimed, "By God 
we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all."130 This zeal to 
pursue its objectives has been employed in several ways. 
B. Tools Used by the U.S. to Carry Out Its Edicts 
To bring about unilateral compliance, the United States often re-
sorts to threats of sanctions or actual sanctions or threats of military 
force or actual military force. "The U.S. has slapped economic sane-
122. Id. See also STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, RISE To GLOBALISM - AMERICAN FOREIGN Poucy 
SINCE 1938 140-147 (51h ed. 1988) (discussing U.S. financial and military involvement in the 
Vietnam). 
123. Id. 
124. Huntington, supra note 63, at 42 
125. Korb, supra note 52, at 23. 
126. Michael Elliott, America Is Back, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 9, 1995, at 44. 
127. JoHN G. STOESSINGER, WHY NATIONS Go TO WAR 197-98 (6th ed. 1993 ). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 199-200. 
130. Id. at 202. 
17
Wu: Saddam Hussein as Hostes Humani Generis? Should the U.S. Interven
Published by SURFACE, 1998
72 Syracuse J. lnt'I L. & Com. [Vol. 26:55 
tions on other countries about 120 times in the past 80 years." 131 Sanc-
tions "offer a way of doing something short of actually using military 
force, about troublesome issues from human-rights ... to drift-net fish-
ing on the high seas."132 
The United States also uses "Most Favored Nation"133 status to 
manipulate "liberty opponents" into conforming to U.S. expectations. 
"MFN" treatment is an obligation to treat that state, its nationals or 
goods, no less favorably than any other state, its nationals or goods."134 
The United States has tried to impose its own cold war mentality 
and habits onto the international scene by using bluffs and counter-
bluffs, 135 to gain advantages. To bring about compliance, the United 
States often deploys its military as a show of force to the offender. The 
U.S. Sixth Fleet was deployed during the late 60's to the Mediterranean 
after Israel seized the Golan Heights, Jordan, the West Bank, and Jerusa-
lem.136 Also, during the Cuban missile crisis, the United States put forth 
a strong showing of its military might. 137 In 1962, Washington was con-
vinced that the Soviet Union was placing or about to place nuclear-capa-
ble missiles in Cuba. 138 As a result, Congress passed a resolution that 
the United States was going "to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an 
externally supported military capability endangering the security of the 
United States."139 The CIA stepped up reconnaissance of the island and 
began a special daily report on activities in Cuba.140 This action was 
done even though no missiles were actually found in Cuba. 141 
In the 1980' s, the United States supported, with military aid, the so-
called "freedom fighters" or "contras" during the conflict in El Salvador. 
The United States justified the support because, according to U.S. stan-
dards, the U.S. intended to prevent a brutal military takeover of the 
131. Thomas Omestad, Addicted To Sanctions, U.S. NEws AND WoRLD REP., June 15, 1998, 
at 30. 
132. Id. 
133. See General Agreement on Tariffs And Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.l.A.S. 
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (signatories are automatically given MFN status). 
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 801(1) 
(1987). 
135. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, RISE To GLOBALISM - AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1938 
267 (5th rev. ed. 1988). 
136. Id. at 223. 
137. Pat M. Holt, Secret Intelligence And Public Policy - A Dilemma of Democracy 1, 100 
(CQ Press 1995). 
138. Id. 
139. Id., citing Pub. L. No. 87-733, 76 Stat. 697, Oct. 3, 1962. 
140. See Holt, supra note 137, at 100. 
141. Id. 
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country by a totalitarian minority .142 This is the only conclusion the 
United States could have drawn because action had to be taken against 
"liberty's opponent."Pursuing "liberty's opponents" by restoring democ-
racy is a major aspect of U.S. policy. As far as sanctions against Iraq are 
concerned "it now appears that, for at least as long as Saddam is in 
power, the people of Iraq may never get parole from the economic sanc-
tions,"143 imposed on them by the United States. Saddam's aggressive 
acts may lend credibility to U.S. arguments articulating reasons why 
Saddam should be classified as Hostes Humani Generis. 144 At present, 
"the administration strongly believes that Saddam must be kept in his 
cage with strict economic sanctions, and that he must be militarily 
whacked when he acts up."14s 
To carry out its edicts, the United States frequently uses sanctions. 
Since 1993, the United States has imposed unilateral sanctions or 
threatened legislation that would allow it to do so, sixty times on thirty-
five countries that represent over forty percent of the world's popula-
tion."146 Unfortunately for the United States, 
The policy of unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran [and Iraq] has 
been ineffectual, and the attempt to coerce others into following 
America's lead has been a mistake. Extraterritorial bullying has gener-
ated needless friction between the United States and its chief allies and 
threatened the international free trade order that America has promoted 
for so many decades. To repair the damages and avoid further self-
infticted wounds, the United States should sit down with the Europeans, 
the Japanese, and its Gulf allies and hash out what each other's interests 
are, what policies make sense in trying to protect those interests, and 
how policy disagreements should be handled. Only such high-level con-
sultation can yield multilateral policies toward Iran [and other nations 
that are classified by the U.S. as "liberty's opponents"] that stand a good 
chance of achieving their goals and being sustainable over the long 
term.141 
More recently, after the bombing of U.S. embassies in Africa, "doz-
ens of American cruise missiles struck targets in Afghanistan and the 
Sudan." According to President Clinton, this was an act of self-defense 
142. Id. at 330-31. 
143. Who's in Charge Here? NEWSWEEK, Dec 1997, at 30-31. 
144. See Lewis, infra note 256 (Iraq stated that it would not cooperate with UN Inspectors 
seeking to check its weapons of mass destruction.) 
145. Who's in Charge Here? NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 1997, at 30-31. 
146. Charles William Maynes, The Perils of (and for) An Imperial America, FOREIGN 
PoL'Y, Summer 1998, at 36, 44. 
147. Zbigniew Brzezinski, et al., Differentiated Containment: Policies Toward Iran and 
Iraq, FoREIGN AFF., May-June, 1997, at 20, 28. 
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against imminent terrorist plots and of retribution for the bombing. "Let 
our action today send this message loud and clear," Mr. Clinton said, 
"There are no expendable American targets. There will be no sanctuary 
for terrorist." 148 
Many of the arguments concerning U.S. activity may be justifiable 
and should carry great weight in an international dialogue concerning 
the multilateral or even better the supranational approach to solving in-
ternational disputes. The U.S. has not only acted unilaterally on many 
occasions, but also has the attitude that it must protect humanity. Never-
theless, terrorist attacks against Americans can only exacerbate the is-
sue, and most people will agree that the United States has a duty to 
protect its nationals. Does the lack of a supranational forum justify this 
unilateral activity? 
LACK OF PROPER INTERNATIONAL FOR A TO PURSUE 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 
The exposure of the individual to direct prosecution for the com-
mission of war crimes under international law is now well established by 
the various trials held principally after the Second World War. 149 Never-
theless, no permanent international court exists to address certain types 
of activity. As a result, "the question has been raised from time to time 
in the ensuing years as to whether a permanent international criminal 
court should be established with jurisdiction to try not only war crimes 
but such other criminal [and civil] acts as international law may iden-
tify?" 150 International sentiment and need mandate establishment of 
such a tribunal. Especially in light of the United States perceived ag-
gression in prosecuting international criminals. 151 And also, the situa-
tion that may exist in the very near future is that the U.S. will be forced, 
by Saddam's actions, to pursue Saddam under the "HHG" theory. 
Prior to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), international disputes were usually 
solved through the arbitration process. 
The process of arbitration was carried forward, in the nineteenth 
century, from the arbitral commissions established under the Jay Treaty 
of 1794 through a series of British-American Claims Commissions, 
dealing with claims arising out of the War of Independence, the War of 
148. James Bennet, U.S. Cruise Missiles, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al. 
149. ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 73 
(1991). 
150. Id. 
151. See supra notes 45, 85, 100, and 102. 
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1812 and the Civil War; by numerous bilateral arbitrations dealing with 
boundary disputes and territorial claims; by a string of ad hoc arbitra-
tions on other matters, including claims arising out of the treatment of 
aliens; by a number of other commissions adjudicating groups of claims 
between the United States on the one hand and, on the other, respec-
tively Britain, Mexico, Peru, Spain, France and also between Brit-
ain ... Peru, Venezuela, and so on.152 
A. International Court of Justice 
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), established by the 
United Nations charter, is the principal judicial organ of the United Na-
tions. Each member of the UN undertakes to comply with the decisions 
of the ICJ in any case to which it is a party. International adjudication in 
the 1990' s is basically a consensual type of process. For example, "the 
ICJ has no jurisdiction unless the parties have specifically agreed thereto 
either through treaty or by accepting the Optional Clause in appropriate 
terms. A state party to a dispute with another state may submit that 
dispute to the International Court of Justice for adjudication and the 
Court has jurisdiction over that dispute, if the parties: a) have, by a spe-
cial agreement ( compromis) or otherwise, agreed to bring and dispute 
before the Court; or b) are bound by an agreement providing for the 
submission to the Court of a category of disputes that includes the dis-
putes in question; or c) have made declarations under Article 36(2) of 
the Statute of the Court accepting the jurisdiction of the Court generally 
or in respect of a category of legal disputes that includes the dispute in 
question. 153 
Every other tribunal, whether specially created or institutional, is 
likewise dependent upon the consent of the parties. 154 For example, the 
United States excepted to the Court's jurisdiction in Iran v. United 
States. 155 Twelve years earlier, the United States also attempted to re-
152. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 149, at 14. 
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES? 903, 362 
(1987) See ICJ, art. 93, 94 et. seq. (The U.S. accepted the ICJ's jurisdiction but excluded several 
areas: a. disputes the solution of which the parties shall entrust to other tribunals by virtue of 
agreements already in existence of, which may e concluded in the future; b. disputes with regard 
to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America, 
and c. disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless 1) all parties to the treaty affected by the 
decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or 2) the United States of America specially 
agrees to jurisdiction.) 
154. Id. at 23. 
155. The Aerial Incident of 3 July 1998 (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.CJ. 9, (the case was later 
settled between the parties). 
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move itself from the ICJ' s jurisdiction in a dispute with Nicaragua. 156 
Nicaragua complained of U.S. involvement in its war. These are only a 
few examples of the drawbacks the Court faces. 
There is no effective forum available to prosecute criminals, inter-
nationally .157 Political rifts between nations make prosecuting criminals 
in the international setting almost impossible. 158 "What may violate the 
laws of the United States may not necessarily violate the laws of another 
nation, such that the other nation would likely object to prosecuting its 
own nationals in the interests of foreign comity."159 These objections 
"will be compounded, however, when it comes to securing agreements 
on the type of court that is to be established in particular on its composi-
tion and procedure, as well as on the types of punishment that it will be 
able to inflict in the event of conviction."160 In desiring to establish such 
a court, many questions are brought to the forefront: "what will the es-
tablishment of such a jurisdiction achieve; will it make the world a more 
law-abiding place; will it significantly add to the existing system of na-
tional enforcement of the criminal"?161 Even if these questions can not 
be answered with a simple "yes," the international community must at-
tempt to establish such a forum and the U.S. must commit to it. Human-
ity deserves it - especially in light of possibly using the Hostes Humani 
Generis Theory unilaterally and especially if the United States intends to 
adopt the theory and make it an integral part of its jurisdictional law, 
another expansion of its extraterritorial jurisdiction. In other words, if 
the United States makes it part of its national law, analogous to the "ef-
fects doctrine" or the Alien Tort Act, other concerns about its unilateral 
activity are bond to surface. 
156. Nicaragua v. United States, Preliminary I.CJ. Ruling on Nicaraguan Request, May 10, 
1984, DEP'T ST. BULL., June. 1994, at 78-80. 
157. This was and still may be true, prior to the establishment of the very recent Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC). See Rome Statute - International Criminal Court, adopted by the 
UN Diplomatic Conf. Plenipotentiaries, 17 July 1998. NCONF.183/9 (This Court is untested; its 
members may mirror the UN membership, and the Statute is open for signatures until 12/31/2000 
(Art 125); thus, this paper neither projects the possible future effectiveness of the Court nor does it 
suggest that the Court is the proper forum to solve international disputes - it has no jurisdiction 
over civil matters. UN Secretary-General (Annan stated that "it is my fervent hope that by then a 
large majority of United Nations Member States will have signed and ratified it, so that the Court 
will have unquestioned authority and the widest possible jurisdiction." www.un.org/icc/pressrel/ 
lrom23.htm. Even though the Court has jurisdiction over the following crimes: a) The crime of 
genocide; b) crimes against humanity; c) War crimes; and d) The crime of aggression (Art. 5); 
limitations exists; its jurisdiction has limits. See infra note 276. 
158. Shin, supra note 116, at 388. 
159. Id. 
160. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 149, at 74. 
161. Id. at 74-75. 
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B. United Nations 
The United Nations is another organization, though not a court, 
which was originally created to help nation-states facilitate the peaceful 
resolution of international disputes. 162 Its purpose is to 1) maintain in-
ternational peace and security, to take effective collective measures for 
the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppres-
sion of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring 
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law; 2) to develop friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of people, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal 
peace; and, 3) to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the 
attainment of these common ends. 163 
The current argument is that its members should cede "absolute and 
exclusive sovereignty" and give the U.N. additional authority. 164 Unfor-
tunately, the UN is not all-inclusive and a broad assortment of new ac-
tors (nations) are appearing on the world scene. 165 The UN was 
designed to be both the world organization and the organization of its 
member states, responding both to global concerns and to the needs of 
member states and their people. As if in training for precisely this mo-
ment, the UN has in its fifty years gained enormous experience in con-
tending with the problems that both trends have spawned. 166 
Even though the UN has and continues to play a key role in interna-
tional issues, its scope and effectiveness are extremely limited. The UN 
is not equipped to fully operate as a supranational organization because, 
"regional arrangements, non-governmental organizations, parliamentari-
ans, transnational business, academic and policy research institutions, 
the media - all are taking on greater global roles. Their collective impact 
on world events now surpasses that of traditional international struc-
tures. As civil strife and social disarray undermine the authority of the 
state, these networks of new actors also erode it." 167 
The UN has spent nearly four years negotiating the development of 
a permanent international criminal court to try war crimes, genocide, and 
162. Jessie Helms, Saving The U.N., FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 86, 89. 
163. Supra note 157. 
164. See Helms, supra note 162, at 3 
165. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Global Leadership After The Cold War, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-
Oct. 1996, at 86, 89. 
166. Id. at 87 
167. Id. at 89. 
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crimes against humanity, 168 (or "HHG" types). Even though backers of 
a strong court support jurisdiction over internal as well as external con-
flicts, others are concerned about the extent of the court's jurisdiction, 
which crimes to include, and the court's relationship with the UN Secur-
ity Council. 169 Possible questions arise relating directly to the United 
Nation's ability to contain Saddam Hussein: Should not the United Na-
tions be empowered now, however, to take action against a war lover 
who murders his own people? Saddam's atrocities had major global 
repercussions: a flood tide of refugees, an obsession with nuclear weap-
ons, and ecological terrorism on an unprecedented scale. Has the time 
not come at last for the United Nations to weigh the sacred principles of 
national sovereignty against untold human suffering?"170 
At this point, the UN cannot handle the demands of the growing 
international community. Nevertheless, "[c]ivilization must defend it-
self against the war lover [Saddam]. This is a formidable task since it 
may be impossible to recognize and repeal the Saddam's of the world, in 
an effort to repel absolute evil when it first appears." 171 Nevertheless, 
the United States continues to take a hard stand on aggressive activity 
that tend to affect the United States and world peace. The United States 
cannot continue to serve in this role - an international tribunal with arbi-
tration, adjudication, and enforcement powers is needed. 
C. The World Trade Organizaton 
The World Trade Organization172 "shall provide the common insti-
tutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its members 
in matters related to the agreements and associated legal instru-
ments .... [it] shall provide the forum of negotiating among its members 
concerning multilateral trade relations ... [and] a forum for further nego-
tiations among its members concerning multilateral trade relations." 
The WTO also administers rules and procedures governing the settle-
168. The U.N. and War Crimes - How Strong A Court, THE EcoNOMIST, June 13, 1998, at 
46. 
169. Id. 
170. STROESSINGER, supra note 127, at 206. 
171. Id. 
172. World Trade Organization (hereinafter WTO),General Agreement on Tariffs And 
Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994, 33 l.L.M. 1125, 1140 (1994), available in 1994 WL 761491 
(G.A.T.T.). See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) 
(The major focus of the WTO is trade. According to the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations of 
4/15/94, the Ministers "affirmed[ed] that the establishment of the WTO ushers in a new era of 
global economic cooperation, reflecting the widespread desire to operate in a fairer and more open 
multilateral trading system for the benefit and welfare of their people." 
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ment of disputes; administer trade policy review mechanism. Even with 
the existence of the WTO, foreign leaders question the United States' 
withdrawal of support for the multilateral trading system. 173 
The United States has been accused of not embracing the WTO by 
its action to avoid bringing its trade disputes to the body. The accusers 
further assert that the U.S. is trying to solve its problems through bilat-
eral agreements at best or unilateral fiat at worst. 174 This attitude is 
probably due to U.S. belief that many of the trade barriers with Japan 
[and others], lack of antitrust protection, collusion between suppliers and 
manufacturers, and suffocating regulations are not yet within the WTO' s 
competence. 175 It has been suggested that: 1) we cannot rely on one 
source to ensure compliance in international matters and disputes, con-
sidering that U.S. intelligence agencies affect trends in the global econ-
omy and the economic policies of key nations more effectively than the 
World Trade Organization;176 and, 2) countries "use their intelligence 
services for industrial espionage against American companies, providing 
the information they steal to their own industrial firms as they seek un-
fair advantage ... [and] by various devices, they exert extraordinary pres-
sure, financial and otherwise, to help their own firms win contracts away 
from American businesses - contracts that they cannot otherwise obtain 
in fair competition."177 It has also been questioned whether the World 
Trade Organization's lack of efficiency lead to unilateral activity be-
cause of violations of the rules of the games in international trade. 
Many feel that this "substitution of the law of the jungle for estab-
lished international rules ... encourages unbridled mercantilism, protec-
tionism, and heightened political tension between countries, weakening 
global trade." 178 The WTO's view is to achieve greater coherence in 
global economic policy making; 179 even if all the criticism is true, the 
unfortunate aspects of the WTO is that many years are required to de-
173. Jeffrey E. Garten, Is America Abandoning Multilateral Trading? FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-
Dec. 1995, at 50. 
174. See Garten supra note 173. See Ann Swardson, U.S. Turtle Law in Conflict With 
World Trade Group, Hous. CttRON., Aug. 24, 1998, at 60 (In the five years since the United 
States supported the creation of the World Trade Organization to resolve international trade dis-
putes, the long-standing question always has been: Will the U.S. comply if a big decision goes 
against it? The question arose in 1996, when the European Union filed a complaint with the 
Geneva-based trade regulatory body over the Helms-Burton Act, which prohibits other countries 
from doing certain kinds of business with Cuba. The U.S. said openly that it would not change the 
law even if the trade body overruled it. 
175. See Garten, supra note 173. 
176. See Woolsey, supra note 75, at 4 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 50. 
179. WTO art. III, § 5. 
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velop adequate laws on such barriers. Not only are the new organiza-
tion's hands full with traditional problems, but many of the problems are 
deeply rooted in the history, culture, and institutions of their societies, 
and the wide variations among countries make multilateral liberalization 
extremely difficult.180 
D. War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
The War Crimes Tribunal was established under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 181 The Tribunal was established for the 
sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for violating interna-
tional and humanitarian laws in Yugoslavia after 1991. This Tribunal 
was borne out of great international concern for reports of mass killings, 
massive and systematic detention and rape of women, and the continu-
ance of the practice of "ethnic cleansing," especially in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina. Like the United States in many of its decisions, the UN 
determined that the situation was a threat to international peace and 
security. 
Even though the international community supports the Tribunal, 
out of 74 indictments only a few are in custody or have actually been 
tried. Of theses five or so in custody, none are top political or military 
leaders who gave key orders for the rapes, torture, executions, etc. 182 
The Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has encountered great difficul-
ties because of its lack of police power, ability to effectuate arrests, in-
ability to properly investigate, and the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms. 183 Its inability to properly investigate led to the with-
drawal of charges against four Bosnian Croat suspects who were on its 
official "wanted" list. The decision was taken from "lack of 
evidence."184 
Another serious drawback for the Yugoslavian Tribunal, according 
to Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor, is that, "Bosnia and particularly 
Croatia had been unwilling to assist185 the Tribunal in arresting and pro-
viding information about suspects wanted for war crimes. In many 
180. See Garten, supra note 173, at 55. 
181. U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
182. Theodor Meron, Answering For War Crimes - Lessons From The Balkans, 76 FOREIGN 
AFF. 2, 3 (1997). 
183. Id. at 8. 
184. War Crimes Tribunal Withdraws Charges Against Four, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS, Dec. 
19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13457719. 
185. Belgrade Kept Rejecting Surrender of War Crimes Suspects, AGENCE FR-PREss, Feb. 
13, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2221757, Yugoslav Authorities Rejected a Call by The Chief UN 
War Crimes Prosecutor to Extradite War Crimes Suspects For Trial in The Hague. 
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cases, governments that are supposed to cooperate with the Tribunal 
have instead taken the side of the accused." 186 
Nevertheless, "we must not give up in despair." 187 A concerted 
effort by the major powers and the developing powers is the only way to 
combat the growing problem of resolving international conflict, civil, 
criminal, or humanitarian issues. 
E. The Need for and Efforts to Develop a Supranational Tribunal 
with Judicial and Enforcement Capability 
Several countries have recently shown their strength by detonating 
nuclear weapons. 188 Some of the U.S. bravado may come because of 
past accomplishments. Remember that, "the United States defeated Na-
zism, contained the Soviet empire, and lifted Europe and Japan from the 
ashes. . .. " 189 
As globalization increases, the need to revitalize international law 
and promote its progressive expansion has taken on even greater ur-
gency. Ideology and power politics have in recent decades dealt serious 
blows to international law. As more and more problems of order and 
justice are experienced transnationally, the international community 
must recognize that the pursuit of more effective international law and 
legal institutions is one of the most compelling challenges it faces. 190 
To that end, even though the ICJ, UN, WTO, and the War Crimes 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia are not equipped to arbitrate com-
plex international issues. The international community is actively dis-
cussing the possibility of some type of international world court. In 
March more than 100 countries' delegates met at the UN in New York. 
Their task was to draft a treaty designed to establish a court. The court 
would have jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity .191 Crimes against humanity should at least encompass Hostes 
Humani Generis types. Most countries seem to favor such a court, 
which would have judicial and enforcement powers. Nevertheless, legit-
imate concerns are inevitable when 180 countries come together to reach 
an agreement. Four of the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, notably the United States and France, are reluctant to give the 
186. War Crimes Prosecutor Calls Yugoslav Nations Uncooperative, Dow JoNES lNT'L 
NEws SERV ., May 24, 1998. 
187. Id. 
188. See infra notes 209-211. 
189. Joshua Muravchik, Affording Foreign Policy-The Problem is not Wallet, But Will, FOR-
EIGN AFF. Mar.-Apr.1996, at 8. 
190. See Boutros, supra note 165, at 89. 
191. International, All Gum, No Teeth? THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1998, at 50. 
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court the powers and independence that its advocates insist it needs to 
have the needed credibility. American negotiators wanted the court to 
investigate only cases referred to it by the Security Council. 192 This gen-
erated some fear that the court would become "a political tool of the 
great powers."193 This result would neither address the concerns of the 
emerging countries nor would it address the needs of the "great powers" 
and the international community as a whole. The March meeting was 
one of the precursors to the newly established International Criminal 
Court. 194 
Hostes Humani Generis types are probably implicitly included in 
the crimes against humanity language, which has been included as one 
of the crimes that should be under the court's jurisdiction. The interna-
tional community strongly agrees that those indicted for war crimes in 
the former Yugoslavia should be brought to justice. 195 Most of the ac-
tivities are directly against humanity insofar as they actually threaten the 
international community's balance. 
Continued international dialogue is a great sign that nations are in-
terested in a multinational solution to the growing problems of global-
ization, which unfortunately brings about an increase in international 
disputes. Thus, continued unilateral interference always breeds a lack of 
trust and thwarts needed dialogue and action in this critical area. The 
U.S. Information Agency polled Croats, to inquire as to the most press-
ing issue facing their country. Croats, Muslims, and Serbs alike consist-
ently ranked bringing war criminals to justice near the very bottom. 
Only about six percent of any faction member thought it was impor-
tant.196 "It would seem that the whole business is much more important 
to Washington."197 
These responses are instructive because they allow the United 
States and others to reflect on the impact that multilateral decisions have 
on consensus building. Even when nations come together to map out 
solutions to international problems, difficulties exist. Therefore, the 
United States should always make legitimate attempts to gain interna-
tional support when it has to make decisions that may have broad range 
implications. This is especially true when prosecuting international 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. See supra note 157. See also Establishment of an International Criminal Court, G.A. 
Res. 51/207, Dec. 17, 1996, available in 361.L.M. 510 (1997) (deciding that a diplomatic confer-
ence of plenipotentiaries shall be held in 1998 with a view to finalizing and adopting a convention 
on the establishment of Int'l. Crim. Court). 
195. Charles G. Boyd, Making Bosnia Work, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb 1998, at 42, 49. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 51. 
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criminals with questionable contacts within the United States, and when 
the decisions to pursue the issues are employed without assistance from 
the criminal's home country. The ICC should restrict U.S. aggression in 
this complicated area, but a diplomatic approach is necessary to solve 
the continuing problem that emerging nations and nations that, in the 
past, have exhibited aggressive behavior are often left outside the United 
Nations' umbrella. 
In the area of trade and open markets, the question has been asked 
whether "it would . . .make sense to create a small, international group 
of wise men that would present recommendations to the group of seven 
("G7'') and the WTO on the next steps to strengthen the multilateral 
trading system"?198 Even if the question were expanded to include all 
disputes affecting the international community, especially criminal pros-
ecution, the entity would require nearly unbridled powers coupled with 
the authority to enforce. Its job would be to interpret the law and to say 
what the law is. 199 This same concept would have to be extended to a 
supranational judicial entity, which would have a duty to interpret and 
enforce. Many thought the "New World Order," where international in-
stitutions, led by the United Nations, would bring about peace with ac-
tive support from the world's major powers where centralized rule-
making authority, a hierarchy of institutions, and universal membership 
are all required.200 "That world order is a chimera. The United Nations 
cannot function effectively independent of the major powers that com-
pose it, nor will those nations cede their power and sovereignty to an 
international institution. Efforts to expand supranational authority, 
whether by the UN secretary-general's office, the European Commis-
sion, or the World Trade Organization (WTO), have consistently pro-
duced a backlash among member states."201 
If the WTO is ineffective as a trade regulatory body, can it manage 
a supranational tribunal? Nevertheless, if harmony is truly wanted, the 
major and minor powers must enter into serious dialogue and assess 
existing organizations to determine if either can work as a catalyst to 
develop an "inclusive" world tribunal not a tribunal to merely mirror the 
UN. This tribunal must not only have a commitment from the interna-
tional community, but must also include emerging, and perhaps aggres-
198. Id. 
199. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (the U.S. Supreme Court established, 
early in U.S. judicial history, emphatically that it was the province and the duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is). 
200. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 
183. 
201. See Garten, supra note 53, at 61. 
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sive nations, as well. Only when this happens, can an organization 
dedicated to justice and world harmony achieve success in this very 
static international community. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL DEFIANCE AND LACK OF SUPPORT FOR PAST 
U.S. AGGRESSION AND INTERVENTION 
The U.S. has accepted the role of international peacekeeper, but not 
without adverse reactions. The legal traditions of most civil law coun-
tries, as well as some common law countries, regard the non-extradition 
of their citizens as an important principle deeply ingrained in their legal 
tradition. They justify the principle because they view the state's role as 
an obligation to protect its citizens and maintain a lack of confidence in 
the fairness of foreign judicial proceedings, the many disadvantages de-
fendants have when they try to defend themselves in a foreign court. 202 
Specifically, India believed the United States has, in the past, un-
fairly singled it out from Pakistan and Israel, two other key Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty non-signatory states.203 Throughout the 80's, at 
the height of Pakistan's nuclear weapons project, the United States pur-
sued a policy of strategic alliance and military largess without which 
Pakistan's success in developing nuclear weapons would have been 
highly unlikely.204 Thus, India recently ignored United States' wishes 
and set off three underground nuclear explosions. Ignoring loud protests 
and threats of economic sanctions, it set off two more two days 
later.205Les Gelb, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, said 
that India knew that the global reactions would be based on the accepted 
premise that powerful weapons should be strictly controlled.206 When 
nations are "willing to pay a high price for their national honor," says 
Gelb, "it is almost impossible to prevent them doing so." "There are 
places, we now know, where Washington's writ does not run."207 The 
United States could get no countries besides Canada and Japan to agree 
to impose economic sanctions on India. 208 
Even though Saddam may be in imminent danger of the United 
States labeling him, officially, as Hostes Humani Generis, and possibly 
202. See Shin, supra note 116, at 439. 
203. Deepa Ollapally and Raja Ramanna, U.S.-India Tensions Misconceptions on Nuclear 
Proliferation, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 13. 
204. Id. at 16. 
205. Steven Thomma, U.S. Finding Its Roar Lacks Bite in Recent Foreign Upheavals, 
Hous.CHRON., May 15, 1995, at 36A. 
206. Michael Elliot, Out of Pandora's Box, NEWSWEEK, June 8, 1998, at 21. 
207. Id. (emphasis added). 
208. See Thomma, supra note 205, at 36A. 
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taking aggressive action to physically contain him, he nevertheless 
closed off presidential palaces to United Nations weapons inspectors last 
October. The United States threatened military action, but it never won 
broad support from allies or even Middle East countries that might be 
threatened by Iraq.209 More recently, "Iraq sa[id] it would hold up oil 
sales if the UN did not approve a new oil-for-food program due to start 
on June 4th."210 American allies have sanctions fatigue and, therefore, 
rarely back U.S. penalties anymore.211 The United States may deter-
mine that another unilateral act, even if within another sovereign, may 
be the only way to stop Saddam.212 
Sanctions are credited with actually hampering Saddam's efforts to 
develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; nevertheless, to be 
effective, sanctions must have broad international support, and they must 
target specific vulnerabilities.213 This support is becoming more and 
more difficult for the United States to obtain. This difficulty, warranted 
or not, has been expressed by other nations advocating lifting sanctions 
against Iraq. Specifically, "Baghdad looks forward with growing confi-
dence to a crucial Security Council meeting next October, when Russia, 
France, and China are expected to continue their push for easing sanc-
tions imposed on Iraq."214 One positive sign, perhaps, is that the United 
States withdrew one of its aircraft carriers from the Iraqi region, which 
had been there since the face-off with Saddam last November. The U.S. 
owned land-based warplanes have also been reduced to about two-hun-
dred. 215 With U.S. forces thinning out, Saddam may think that he can 
defy UN inspectors and not risk military retaliation.216 During the early 
stages of the Iraq crisis, nations overtly supported Iraq. After the total 
U.S. embargo against Iraq, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe stated 
that "we do not believe in unilateral embargoes."217 The United States' 
continued aggressive involvement in Iraqi matters is continually met 
with criticism. On February 4, 1998, Russian Federation President, Bo-
209. See Thomma, supra note 205, at 36A .. 
210. Iraq And The U.N. Chronology of a Crisis, THE HERALD, June 16, 1998, at 2. 
211. Thomas Omestad, Addicted To Sanctions, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REP., June 15, 1998, 
at 30. 
212. See supra notes 85-93. 
213. Id. 
214. Joseph Contreras and Russell Watson, Saddam's Old Tricks, NEWSWEEK, June 15, 
1998, at 35. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Russell Watson, Karen Breslau, and John Barry, So Who Needs Allies? NEWSWEEK, 
May 15, 1995, at 36. 
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ris Yeltsin, stated that "Bill Clinton's actions in the [UN Arms Inspec-
tions] crisis could lead to world war."2 1s 
Hostility toward U.S. actions has been expressed on many fronts, 
not only is the middle easterners complaining but also other countries as 
well, including allies. Early on, some Panamanians accepted U.S. ac-
tions against Noriega, a one-time ally, as rough but benign justice to deal 
with a stubborn despot, and protection for democracy and U.S. interests 
in Panama.219 "The combined cost paid by the Panamanian people for 
their liberation is increasingly viewed in Panama City as 
unacceptable. "220 
The U.S. Congress has also been far from enthusiastic about U.S. 
behavior in the area of extraterritorial arrests and abductions, even 
though media headlines bombard Americans everyday about the "War 
on Drugs" and the "War on Terrorism."221 For example, Congress 
adopted an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, 222 which prohibits 
U.S. officers or employees from engaging in direct arrests in any foreign 
country. 223 
The United States' view is that "refusing to exercise jurisdiction is 
far more drastic a step than excluding evidence produced by the illegal 
arrest; it completely deprives the state of the opportunity to present its 
case. This view reflects the notion that due process is limited to the 
guarantee of a fair trial, but that interstate or international abductions are 
not misconduct sufficiently egregious to justify releasing the defend-
ant. 224 This interpretation supports the U.S. position to exercise jurisdic-
tion, even in attenuated circumstances where contacts are minimal. 
After Dr. Alvarez-Machain's abduction, an uproar took place in the 
governments of Central and South America. 225 The governments of 
many Central and South American nations called for the expulsion of 
American ambassadors. After the Supreme Court's decision in the case, 
Mexico suspended the right of U.S. agents to conduct business in Mex-
218. Iraq And the U.N. Chronology of A Crisis, THE HERALD, June 16, 1998, at 2. 
219. Tim Coone, U.S. Invasion Brings Panama Slim Dividends, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), 
Dec. 20, 1990, at 6. 
220. Id. 
221. See Lowenfeld, supra note 103, at 477. See also Richard J. Newman, America Fights 
Back, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Aug. 31 1998, at 38 (discussing the impact after two U.S. 
embassies in Africa were bombed, the resulting U.S. action, Operation Infinite Reach - amounting 
to one of the most decisive attacks against suspected terrorists in years). 
222. Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c) (1961). 
223. See Lowenfeld, supra note 103, at 477(discussing. 481c, the amendment to the FAA of 
1961). 
224. See Lowenfeld, supra note 103, at 468, citing case comment, United States v. Tos-
canino, 88 HARVARD L. REv. 813, 816 (1975). 
225. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
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ico.226 This inconsistent U.S. policy is definitely a source of contention. 
Both U.S. intervention, by using its courts, and its reaction to certain 
international activity are inconsistent. "The Gulf rulers ... are acutely 
aware of the American double standard that lets Israel defy the UN and 
arm itself with nuclear weapons, but is ready to bomb Iraq for hanging 
on to drums of anthrax or nerve gas."221 
Even though some of the gulf countries look for trade with Iraq, 
they will do almost nothing to weaken relations with the United 
States.228 Even so, that reality does not necessarily conclude the matter. 
In the last ten years, the United States and Europe have paid scant regard 
to the Subcontinent. The Balkans, Russia and China have loomed much 
larger in the councils of the rich. This disregard was probably a mistake, 
considering that India and Pakistan are not just proud nations, but ones 
with intense rivalry and well known nuclear programs.229 India's recent 
defiance in detonating a nuclear weapon230 is an example of the extent 
that smaller, perhaps mostly non-aggressive, nations may go to either 
protect themselves or try to receive recognition as legitimate compo-
nents of the international community. India's defiance shows that India 
and the rest should not have been treated this way.231 The major task is 
to undo that error. If the world's major powers commit to including 
smaller nations in the development of entities that touch and concern 
them, it can be done. The people in this region are not stupid; they do 
not want a nuclear war - they want a measure of respect to their legiti-
mate concerns about security and international disputes. They deserve 
and should receive consideration. 232 
The United States' inconsistent policy, especially with China, is 
further evinced by the various approaches that its agencies have adopted, 
which leads to very mixed messages. The Office of the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative threatens sanctions over market access and intellectual prop-
erty rights, the Department of Commerce zealously increases 
investments in China; while the Department of State thrashes China for 
226. See Shin, supra note 116, at 391, quoting Kristin B. Weissman, Comment, Extraterrito-
rial Abductions: The Endangerment of Future Peace, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 488-89 (1994). 
227. As Iraq's Clock Ticks On, THE EcoNOMIST, Feb 7, 1998, at 47. See Frank McCoy, A 
World of Opinions About U.S. Strikes, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Aug. 31 , 1998, at 52, (After the 
U.S. bombed Afghanistan, a common theme in the Islamic world "was that the attack violated the 
sovereignty of Sudan and Afghanistan - and demonstrated Washington's willingness to kill inno-
cent civilians). 
228. Id. 
229. See Elliot, supra note 126, at 21. 
230. See supra note 205. 
231. See Elliot, supra note 126, at 21. 
232. Id. 
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human rights violations and nuclear proliferation, and the Department of 
Defense works hard to develop military-to-military ties. The Chinese 
continue to search, in vain, for an underlying rationale to explain these 
chameleon type shifts and conflicting efforts. 233 Even though China 
contends that the U.S. policy is not clear, this contention has not totally 
stayed off harsh threats and sometimes sanctions. Even in the face of 
U.S. threats, China fails to adhere to U.S. demands. Specially, it "re-
buff[ed] American demands on human rights,234 but nevertheless it gar-
nered support. "In almost every instance the G-7 countries have not 
supported American's threats and has made Washington's claim that it is 
acting on behalf of widely accepted international norms ring[s] 
hollow."235 Clinton's May 1994 decision not to link China's most fa-
vored nation trade status renewal to human rights demands reversed 
months of espousing the opposite view, 236 and highlights U.S. 
inconsistency. 
Not only has this inconsistency alienated China but the view that 
Chinese political leaders are unfit, and the suspected desire to exclude 
China from the WTO have also fostered resentment toward the United 
States.237 The U.S. approach to China is, supposedly, predicated on the 
conviction that continued economic and cultural engagement is the best 
way to induce democratization. 238 
The need to obtain international support in the area of intervention 
under the Hostes Humani Generis Theory is critical. The Hostes 
Humani Generis Theory or other similar tools that are used to expand 
jurisdiction extraterritorially will not gain acceptance when employed 
unilaterally. President Clinton's plea to U.S. partners for assistance in 
Bosnia was succinctly articulated and is instructive if the United States 
plans to adopt its concept of what constitutes behavior that is egregious 
enough to label one, even a head of State, an Hostes Humani Generis. 
Clinton stated that "if peace is achieved NATO must help secure 
it. . .America must take part. Only NATO-proven, strong, effec-
tive ... can give the Bosnian people the ... space they need to begin to 
reconcile and rebuild. NATO [is] the anchor of America's and Europe's 
233. Kenneth Lieberthal, A New China Strategy, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 35. 
234. Huntington, supra note 63, at 42. 
235. See Lieberthal, supra note 233, at 35. 
236. See Lieberthal, supra note 233, at 44. 
237. See Lieberthal, supra note 233, at 42, 45. 
238. Strobe Talbott, Democracy And the National Interest, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1996, 
at 57. 
34
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 26, No. 1 [1998], Art. 5
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol26/iss1/5
1998] Saddam Hussein as Hostes Humani Generis? 89 
common security."239 These statements in reality, perhaps uncon-
sciously, exclude many nations. 
Nevertheless, this same passionate plea for assistance from U.S. 
allies should also be employed to develop an international tribunal to 
oversee international disputes. The President also said that "our values, 
interests and security are at stake."240 This is true because aggressive 
acts jeopardize U.S. security. Fringe groups, international terrorist, and 
legitimate nations are, justified or not, impelled to take action when they 
perceived that the United States has acted outside the scope of its juris-
diction by invading sovereigns.241 Internationally, countries and espe-
cially the European countries are very frustrated about the United States' 
approach to justice because the resounding view is that "it is hypocritical 
of the United States to condemn Germany and others for trading with 
Iran while America itself eagerly trades with China."242 Even China 
experiences this hypocrisy because the U.S. policy with China is ex-
tremely inconsistent. 
The Arab nations were incensed by U.S. actions against Iraq. Is-
lamic fundamentalist movements universally supported Iraq rather than 
the Western-backed Kuwaitis and Saudis. Even the Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei put Iran-Iraq differences on the back burner and called for a 
holy war against the West243 : "The struggle against American aggres-
sion, greed, plans and policies will be counted as jihad, and anybody 
who is killed on that path is a martyr." "This is a war," King Hussein of 
Jordan argued, against all Arabs and Muslims and not against Iraq 
alone."244 Muslims also articulated the West's double standard. Where 
civilizations clash, a double standard inevitably exists, and people apply 
one standard to their kindred-countries and a different one to others.245 
Lack of support for the U.S. attack on Iraq after good faith talks had 
failed was also articulated by Jimmy Carter, former U.S. President, 
when he said that "there were never any good faith talks, as a matter of 
fact, and we attacked Iraq without them."246 
239. President Clinton, Why Bosnia Matters to America, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 1995, at 55. 
240. Id. 
241. See Frank McCoy, A World of Opinions About U.S. Strikes, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., 
Aug. 31, 1998, at 52 (quoting reactions the U.S. bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan). 
242. Charles Lane, Germany's New Ostpolitik, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 77, 78. 
243. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations? FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 35, 
36. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. at 36. 
246. Douglas Brinkley, Jimmy Carter's Modest Quest For Global Peace, FOREIGN AFF., 
Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 90. 
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"The British House of Lords recently rebuked the U.S. Supreme 
Court for its decision to uphold the kidnapping of a Mexican doctor by 
U.S. officials determined to bring him to trial in the U.S."247 Also, in 
1994, the tiny country of Singapore defied intense American pressure 
and caned an American teenager for violating the laws of Singapore. 248 
The United States tried to convince the Singaporean government to have 
leniency on the individual. This is a strange reaction to another sover-
eign's jurisdiction in light of U.S. abduction and other intervention prac-
tices. Poland had defied American request not to proceed in buying 
arms from Iran. Jordan has resisted American pressure to break off 
commercial links with Iraq. 249 
Iran, like Iraq, has also been bombarded with U.S. sanctions. Iran 
defied the U.S. supported UN arms embargo and supplied men and 
weapons to Bosnia.250 These sanctions "have not appreciably worsened 
any of the ills [in Iran] whatever their adverse effects, they have not 
been strong enough to induce a noticeable change in Tehran's behav-
ior."251 The International Court of Justice, last December, voted four-
teen-to-two to reject Washington's plea for dismissal and to hear 
Tehran's case against the United States for deliberate destruction of 
three Iranian offshore platforms in the Persian Gulf in 1987. "252 
U.S. restraint is the first step in developing a national, and ulti-
mately an international, policy that can be embraced by the international 
community. "American foreign policy is becoming a foreign policy of 
particularism increasingly devoted to the promotion abroad of highly 
specific commercial and ethnic interests."253 Thus, the alternative to 
particularism is not promulgation of a "grand design," "coherent strat-
egy," for a "foreign policy vision." It is a policy of restraint and recon-
stitution aimed at limiting the diversion of American resources to the 
service of particularistic sub-national, transnational, and non-national in-
terests. The national interest is national restraint and that appears to be 
the only national interest the American people are willing to support at 
this time in their history. Hence, instead of formulating unrealistic 
schemes for grand endeavors abroad, the foreign policy elite might well 
devote their energies to designing plans for lowering American involve-
247. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept-Oct. 1997, at 18. 
248. See Huntington, supra note 243, at 42. 
249. Id at 43. 
250. Huntington, supra note 250, at 48. 
251. Jahangir Amuzegar, Adjusting to Sanctions, FoREIGN AFF., May-June 1997, at 33. 
252. Id. at 35. 
253. See Huntington, supra note 250, at 48. 
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ment in the world in ways that will safeguard future national [and inter-
national] interest254 
The pique of other nations with America's preemptive arrogance 
results from U.S. demands to have its way in one international form after 
another; its actions to imperiously impose trade sanctions that violate 
international understanding, to presumptuously demand national legal 
protection for its citizens, diplomats, and soldiers who are subject to 
criminal prosecution, while insisting other states forego that right; and to 
unilaterally dictate its view on UN reforms or the selection of a new 
secretary general. The United States has been able to get away with 
these tactics; the patience of others is shortening. The difficulty the 
United States had in rounding up support, even from its allies, in the 
recent confrontation with Iraq and Saddam Hussein evinces this 
pique.255 
Fortunately, the United States' demands on Iraq continue to have 
some credence. "After a defiant out-burst from Baghdad ... the Security 
Council voted unanimously to renew economic sanctions against Iraq, 
and the U.S. Representative to the UN warned that the sanctions may 
never be lifted." Specifically, United States Ambassador to the United 
Nations, Bill Richardson, said, "[s]anctions may stay on in 
perpetuity."256 Iraq stated that it would not cooperate with UN inspec-
tors seeking to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction until the Secur-
ity Council starts lifting the trade embargo. 257 Additionally, prior to the 
last event Russia, France, and China had joined to convince the Security 
Council to ease restrictions on Iraq.258 This appeal will continue to be 
unpersuasive, as to the U.S. vote, after recent test conducted at the U.S. 
army lab on warhead fragments excavated in Iraq in March found traces 
of poison VX gas.259 
Nevertheless, to garner international support, we must consider 
The most inadequately examined issue in American politics 
[which] is precisely whether or not post-Cold War conditions offer us a 
chance to change the rules of the international game [?] 
254. Id. at 48. 
255. Charles William Maynes, The Perils of (And For) An Imperial America, 36 FOREIGN 
PoL'Y 44 (1998). 
256. Paul Lewis, UN Council Renews Sanctions After Iraq Expresses Defiance, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 24, 1998, at A8. 
257. Id. 
258. Bruce B. Auster, Proofs of Iraq's VX Gas Warheads, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., July 
6, 1998, at 50. 
259. Id. 
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Certainly, there is no hope of changing the rules of the game if we 
ourselves pursue a policy of world hegemony. Such a policy, whether 
formally announced or increasingly evident, will drive others to resist 
our control, at first unsuccessfully but ultimately with effect. A policy 
of world hegemony in other words, will guarantee that in time America 
will become outnumbered and overpowered. If that happens, we will 
once and for all have lost the present opportunity to attempt to change 
the rules of the game among the great powers.260 
There are those, the United States included, who believe a sem-
blance of international justice can be achieved only where there is a 
balance among relative equals. In this environment, national arrogance 
must be tempered, national aspirations limited, and attempts at hegem-
ony, either benevolent or malevolent, checked. A more evenly balanced 
world, they assume, with the United States cut down a peg or two [or 
three or four] would be freer, fairer, and safer.261 Iraq has voiced a de-
sire to reconcile; even though, the United States is adamant about not 
easing the economic pressure. "Many high-ranking American officials 
keep speaking about Iraq as being a threat to American interests and to 
the region. We would like to assure these officials, and through them 
the American people, that Iraq is eager to live in peace with its neigh-
bors and the world. But Iraq will not submit to intimidation, bullying 
and coercion. Peace will come only through dialogue based on mutual 
respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and the obser-
vance of international law."262 
V. CONCLUSION 
"In facing the ongoing reintegration of international relations, the 
United States Government has spoken of a 'New World Order,' pre-
mised on respect for international law."263 Comparative Law264 is help-
ful in the understanding of foreign peoples; it thereby assists in the 
260. See Maynes, supra note 255, at 46. 
261. Robert Kagan, The Benevolent Empire, FOREIGN PoL'Y, Summer 1998, at 24, 30. 
262. Nizar Hamdoon, A Black Cat in a Dark Room, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1998, at A23, 
(Hamdoon is Iraq's permanent Representative to the United Nations). But see, infra note 231. 
After the U.S. bombed Sudan and Afghanistan, the Chinese Foreign Minister condemned U.S. 
action, saying "that the embassy bombing should have been dealt with through international law. 
Also, Jia Qingguo, a politics professor at Beijing University, complained about what he sees as a 
double standard. "The United States uses military force overseas and international opinion is soft. 
But China uses military force domestically, and people criticize it for being too tough," he said. 
America, he added, acts on the principle of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." 
263. See Ring, supra note 109, at 530 
264. RENE DAVID AND JoHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 
8 (3d ed. 1985). 
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creation of a healthy context for the development of international rela-
tions. 265 "Global changes have undoubtedly complicated the conceiving 
and conducting of U.S. foreign policy."266 Nevertheless, as a nation we 
must recognize that "there are new players, new capabilities, and new 
alignments - but, as yet, no new rules."267 Predictability is absolutely 
mandatory if allies are going to count on us or if foes are to think before 
challenging American interests. Policymakers need bearings by which 
to judge international events. Without them, policy is apt to be steered 
by popular emotions, daily headlines or, increasingly, the latest televised 
image. But what is the solution if an all-embracing doctrine is not avail-
able and particularism is unwise? The answer lies in a foreign policy 
that is clear about ends - American's purposes, priorities, relationships, 
and approach to the world. Thankfully, the potential for fashioning and 
applying such a structure does exist. 268 
A new aspect of foreign relations is arguably emerging from a dis-
crete forum of imperialism based on the extraterritorial application of 
the U.S. law.269 Ultimately, "[a]s the global order rapidly evolves, the 
United States must redefine its role in the international community."270 
"The role suggested by ... recent decisions ... belittles American ideals of 
justice and respect for the rule of law. For the sake of those ideals, for 
the sake of judicial integrity, and for the sake of international law [and 
relations], it is imperative that the administration of the United States 
find no further need to call upon the courts to validate lawless Govern-
ment actions on foreign soil. "271 "Champions of a global rule of law 
have most frequently envisioned one rule for all, a unified legal system 
topped by a world court."272 Until this happens, the United States 
should endeavor to use restraint and avoid backlash from the interna-
tional community. "In the areas of free trade, the 'grand bargain' has 
been suggested. WTO members should consolidate their regional ar-
rangements into a global commitment: the high-income mature econo-
265. Id. 
266. Richard N. Haas, Paradigm Lost-From Containment to Confusion, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-
Feb. 1995, at 43. 
267. Id at 43. 
268. Id. at 45. 
269. See Ring, supra note 109, at 530, citing V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The 
Extraterritorial Application of United States Law, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1980). 
270. Id. at 535. 
271. Id. at 535. 
272. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, supra note 247, at 189. 
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mies of North America and Wes tern Europe would merge in a real 
partnership with the rapidly growing, lower-income countries."273 
This "grand bargain" approach should also be used to continue to 
develop and strengthen an International Tribunal, e.g., the ICC, because 
conflicts often involve complex and sensitive issues that are not clearly 
within the congnizance of a particular sovereign or court. The concern 
that "regional arrangements could develop into hostile blocs"274 is very 
similar to hostility against the United States for extending jurisdiction or 
intervening in attenuated circumstances.275 To ease these legitimate 
concerns a truly international tribunal or "unified legal system" with ju-
dicial, arbitral, and enforcement capabilities is imperative to a global 
community.276 This is especially true because the United States has 
taken on the role of the World's helper in a wide range of situations, 
which affect nations' domestic as well as international policies. Presi-
dent Clinton recently articulated this and said that "We [the U.S.] will 
help all people of all faiths in all parts of the world who want to live free 
from fear and violence. We will persist and we will prevail."277 Sad-
dam probably should heed this warning, especially in light of the recent 
bombings of U.S. embassies and the U.S. strikes in Sudan and Afghani-
stan as a result of the aggression. 
273. C. Fred Bergstein, Globalizing Free Trade, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1996, at 105, 
110. 
274. Id. at 120. 
275. Frank McCoy, A World of Opinions About U.S. Strikes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Aug. 31, 1998, at 52, (After the U.S. bombed Afghanistan and Sudan, a common theme in the 
Islamic world was "that the attacks violated the nations' sovereignty - and demonstrated Wash-
ington's willingness to kill innocent civilians. 
276. The newly established ICC's jurisdiction extends to persons, but "persons" refers to 
nationals of signatories. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. I. See Art.12, 
Preconditions to The Exercise of Jurisdiction (A State which becomes a Party to this Statute 
thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in Art. 5 ... ).; 
Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis, Art. 11 (showing limitations to the Court's jurisdiction, which also 
may lead the U.S. to act unilaterally if the Court refuses to expand its jurisdiction). 
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